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Abstract
The low visibility and specialised languages of mathematical work pose challenges
for the ethnographic study of communication in mathematics, but observation-
based study can offer a real-world grounding to questions about the nature of its
methods. This paper uses theoretical ideas from linguistic pragmatics to examine
how mutual understandings of diagrams are achieved in the course of conference
presentations. Presenters use shared knowledge to train others to interpret dia-
grams in the ways favoured by the community of experts, directing an audience’s
attention so as to develop a shared understanding of a diagram’s features and
possible manipulations. In this way, expectations about the intentions of others
and appeals to knowledge about the manipulation of objects play a part in the
development and communication of concepts in mathematical discourse.
1. Introduction
Observational study of mathematics as it is being shared and created between
individuals today can serve to demystify the discipline and put forward an
account of how mathematical work proceeds that brings real-world interac-
tions between persons and materials into the heart of that work. The more
vividly we can demonstrate the ways that real-world mathematics inhabits
artefacts, people, and discourses, the more we can build up an understanding
of mathematics as study that is conducted by hard interactive work.
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This paper presents some first steps in an ongoing project that aims to do
just that. What follows is a study of knot theory diagramming practices
as observed in presentations of mathematical work, considered using rele-
vance theory, a contemporary linguistic pragmatic theory put forward by
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson [21]. In Section 2, the basic approach of
the paper is laid out, and relevance theory is briefly introduced. In Section
3, the materials and settings of communication at conferences are discussed,
and diagramming is considered as a communicative medium. In Section 4, a
number of examples are put forward that demonstrate the kind of resources
that are leveraged in order for an audience and speaker to arrive at a shared
understanding of the affordances of a diagram.
The intention is to present these examples as a proposal for a way of looking
at interactions between mathematicians that takes into account materials,
settings and the subtleties of communication that go beyond simple inter-
pretation of a code. By considering mathematical communication in these
terms it may be possible to build up a picture of mathematical work as part of
a spectrum of situated, interactive human practices, not encapsulated by its
codified elements. This also constitutes an exploration of the ways in which
ideas developed in linguistic pragmatics to describe the mechanics of every-
day conversation might extend to more specialised and unusual domains.
2. Observation in the wild
Ethnographer of science Bruno Latour expressed concerns about the diffi-
culty of making “inspectable and accountable topics” [17, page 444] of the
processes of mathematics, but in spite of this, observational studies of math-
ematics and exploratory perspectives that place more emphasis on practice
are growing in number [1, 11, 14, 16, 19]. Efforts have increased to carry out
observations in the mathematical world that take up the social and material
aspects of the discipline as being inherently involved in the progress of math-
ematics, notably from sociologist Christian Greiffenhagen, and in the theses
of Lorenzo Lane and Michael Barany [1, 14]. In one paper, Greiffenhagen
focuses on the blackboard as a site for the laying-out of ideas and analyses
features of the inscription practices used (after Latour), in a methodology
designed to bring the materiality of mathematics into sociological investi-
gation [12]. Barany and Mackenzie’s study of chalk goes on to posit “an
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essential relationship between the supposedly abstract concepts and meth-
ods of advanced mathematics and the material substituents and practices
that constitute them” [2, page 2]. If, indeed, progress in the mathematical
world would be substantially hindered by the loss of the materials, interac-
tions and practices that are involved in mathematical work, these should be
taken seriously in a holistic view of what mathematics is.
The question of whether an observer of science should be an insider, with the
knowledge to follow technical conversations, or an outsider, less susceptible
to the problem of ‘going native’, is much debated. This paper gives some
initial results from a research project aimed at subjecting mathematics to
consideration as part of a spectrum of other activities, and in this instance
the perspective of a person not immersed in and committed to the norms of
mathematical culture, aided by discussion with people familiar with the field,
can be considered a distinct advantage. This paper presents close analysis of
a selection of details observed in mathematical talks to consider how diagrams
are used in mathematical communication.
2.1. A brief introduction to relevance theory
This analysis has its basis in relevance theory, a set of ideas from linguistic
pragmatics that is considered to be a theory of communication, rather than
of language, applying broadly to actions that are intended to be recognised
as intentional and communicative. The theory was developed by Dan Sper-
ber and Deirdre Wilson, and is considered a cognitivist theory of real-world
communication [21]. The case has been made (for example in [6]) that it is a
very appropriate tool to use in analysing multimodal communication, due to
its treatment of different kinds of stimuli functioning in a spectrum of ways
(see Section 2.2 on showing and meaning).
Relevance theory rests on a communicative principle of relevance that was
greatly influenced by Paul Grice’s maxims of cooperative communication.
The basic principle is that when a speaker pronounces an utterance or, more
broadly, behaves ostensively, the hearer becomes aware of an intention to
communicate. This produces an expectation in that hearer that whatever
the speaker is trying to communicate will have sufficient effects to justify the
effort that the hearer must invest — and indeed, will keep that effort to an
absolute minimum. The hearer therefore looks for the most relevant interpre-
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tation to satisfy the expectation of relevance that this recognition of intention
promises. Relevance theory describes a process by which hearers weigh the
cognitive effects of an utterance — what an utterance does to strengthen,
develop or contradict an existing assumption — against processing effort,
and seek an interpretation that satisfies the expected balance.
Both effort and effects will depend on a hearer’s cognitive environment, the
set of assumptions manifest to that person at that time, so the speaker brings
extensive beliefs about her audience into play as she selects an optimally
relevant stimulus. For this cooperative work to be successful, relevance theory
holds that both speaker and hearer take their knowledge of one another’s
beliefs and intentions into account in order to communicate as efficiently
and effectively as possible. This means that contextual knowledge about
the speaker and shared environment, beliefs about one another’s knowledge
and assumptions, and attribution of intention are all deeply involved in the
comprehension process that Sperber and Wilson outline [21].
This might be illustrated by considering how an identical stimulus might be
given entirely different interpretations in different contexts, depending on the
intentions ascribed to the communicator. If a knot theorist were to be shown
a symbol like that in Figure 1 on the board by a colleague, she will assume
that he intended the image to be a diagram of a knot in the mathematical
sense — a trefoil knot — and that some operation on or example involving
that knot was to follow. She would have a great many assumptions present
in her mind pertaining to crossings and equivalence, and the problems and
objectives of knot theory, and many experiences of explanations involving
knots such as this. As a result, she would be particularly aware of the
features of the diagram most pertinent to the study of knot theory, such as
its sequence of crossings, and expecting the discussion to proceed down a
certain kind of route that will have cognitive effects in that domain.
If, however, she encountered the same diagram drawn on the wall above
the leftmost one of a pair of bins, she might assume that perhaps the usual
signage had broken and that the symbol had been drawn as a temporary
replacement by somebody intending to communicate to someone such as
herself that the bin on the left was for material to be recycled. This person
would, she would suppose, have selected a conventionalised sign that simply
and effectively distinguishes the two bins to provide immediate effects (letting
her know where to put her paper napkin).
182 Embodied Diagramming Practices in Knot Theory
Figure 1: Trefoil knot diagram from “Heegaard Floer Homology and the Knot Concordance
Group” by Jennifer Hom [23]. All boardwork in this article is reproduced by the author
from board notes in the talks cited.
When we are communicating, we can expect that a speaker will select the
most efficient route possible, and this expectation helps us as we go about
interpreting his utterances. The principle is that in interpreting an utterance,
an audience looks for an interpretation that is optimally relevant. Relevance
here is given a technical definition as follows:
“(1) Relevance of an input to an individual
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive ef-
fects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of
the input to the individual at that time.
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort ex-
pended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at
that time.” [25, page 252]
It is important to note that relevance theory puts forward a view of com-
munication that is not based in retrieving a message or any simple sense of
acquiring knowledge. The cognitive effects mentioned may include “implica-
tions, strengthenings and contradictions resulting in the erasure of premises,”
[21, page 115], and are described in terms of establishing mutual manifest-
ness. This is an interesting notion, weaker than that of mutual knowledge,
which might best be understood as that which is made available to the hearer,
rather than that which is consciously brought to mind. A speaker can aim
to make certain assumptions mutually manifest in the audience’s cognitive
environment, and so develop shared assumptions.
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2.2. A relevance-theoretic approach — how do we understand a diagram?
Grice famously drew a distinction between what he called non-natural mean-
ing (meaningNN) and showing, distinguishing the kind of stimulus interpre-
tation that requires consideration of intentions, and that which can occur
without reference to a speaker’s intentions. Grice claimed that while an
utterance of “St. John is dead” meansNN that that is the case, Herod’s pre-
sentation of St. John’s head on a spike is rather an example of showing; after
all, “Salome can infer that St. John the Baptist is dead solely on the strength
of the evidence presented, and independent of any intentions Herod has in
presenting her with his head” [13, page 218]. Though Grice’s account draws
a clear divide between the two, relevance theorists have reconsidered this
question, arguing that it is something more like an interplay of both direct
and indirect evidence that is considered in utterance interpretation.
Tim Wharton makes the case that relevance theory “recognises both show-
ing and meaningNN as instances of overt intentional or ostensive-inferential
communication”, and argues that showing and meaning ought be considered
as existing on a spectrum. Wharton emphasises “the precise nature of the
evidence provided” [24, page 16], noting that “ostensive stimuli are often
highly complex composites of different, inter-related behaviours which fall at
various points between ‘showing’ and ‘meaningNN’” [24, page 19]. Wharton
refers to Grice’s case of a private detective attempting to let Mr X know that
his spouse has been unfaithful. If the detective is able to acquire a photo-
graph showing Mrs X embracing another person then Grice argues that this
need only be left somewhere where Mr X might find it for him to reach that
belief, whereas if the detective were to draw a picture of the same event (a
more indirect form of ‘evidence’), Mr X would surely need to wonder why he
was being shown this to reach the desired conclusion. Wharton makes the
point that directness is not the only criterion; if the photograph is a little
blurry so that the faces are not clearly seen, Mr X may well need to know or
to guess that he is being intentionally shown this photograph by the private
detective to realise that his spouse is in the picture and reach that conclu-
sion. What’s more, in practice, whenever we encounter a picture in the world
we have some theories in our minds as to why it is we’re seeing it and who
(roughly) has put it there. This picture of showing and meaning suggests
that intentions are considered to varying extents in all kinds of situations,
and that this is not simply dependent on the type of evidence provided, but
a complex set of contextual attributes.
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Danielle Macbeth considers diagrams in Euclid’s elements to be “icons with
Gricean non-natural meaning”, but supplements this with an interesting dis-
cussion of the diagram as something that is itself used to reason with, stating
that “one reasons in the diagram in Euclidean geometry, actualizing at each
stage some potential of the diagram” [18, page 265]. This seems to hint at
more complexity, making a space for something more like direct evidential
reasoning to have a part in diagrammatic functioning. Diagrams clearly oc-
cupy an interesting position between these types of meaning, as tools with
language-like properties but more direct, evidential aspects as well, and one
that is perhaps better described using relevance theory’s spectrum-like pic-
ture than standardly Gricean ideas.
A problem that has been noted with moves to discuss images using theory
with its origin in discussion of language is that even relatively straightforward
pictures can admit an excess of possible interpretations, as demonstrated by
Charles Forceville and Billy Clarke in “Can Pictures Have Explicatures?” [7].
Because even the simplest picture could be transformed into a wide variety of
descriptive sentences, they argue that pictures cannot have explicatures in the
classical, language-oriented, Gricean sense, though they do make the case for
a kind of very explicature-like functioning in some cases where elements are
combined in sufficiently rule-like ways as to more closely constrain translation
[7]. Sperber and Wilson define an explicature as follows:
“An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if
and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.”
[21, page 182]
There is an assumption (brought into play in Forceville and Clark’s dis-
cussion) that this logical form is language-like, in the sense of involving
conventionally-defined, combinable elements with some kind of grammar,
that thus constrain the possible interpretations.
In the case of diagrams as used in mathematical work, interpretation can in-
deed be constrained to a great extent. With training in the use of a particular
diagram, just such a conventional, constraining grammar can be established.
Valeria Giardino in A Practice-Based Approach to Diagrams notes that as
with language, we must learn the correct ways to interpret a diagram, as
“. . . the diagram user — its interpreter — is not interested in many of the
visual properties of the diagram; she only attends to a selection of them . . .
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diagrams are not simply ‘seen’ but must be ‘read’, i.e., interpreted” [9, page
142]. This is a part of her account that hovers between the linguistic and the
visual.
With training, attention can be focused on certain features of a diagram to
the exclusion of others, as Giardino notes:
“Diagram-users share something like the experience of seeing in
a diagram what they have to, focusing their vision on a selection
of relevant features, which will bring them, as rational agents, to
understand and reproduce the relevant features of diagrams in a
non-mechanical way and without ‘damages’.” [9, page 146]
What this means is that a diagram-user develops an understanding of a
diagram as having certain features that are important and relevant and others
that are not. This understanding means that the re-drawing of the diagram
relies not upon imitation of the particular form, but upon a reconstruction
built up from certain important features.
Let’s return to our mathematician encountering the symbol in Figure 1. If
she were to encounter a sketch like this in a simple but expensive frame in
a serious gallery, she might take quite a different approach to it than in the
case of the recycling symbol. Assuming it to be a work of art, she would
be far more likely to pay attention to the particulars of the actual form be-
fore her, considering the exact trajectory that each line takes and wondering
what kind of cycle or vortex the artist was hoping to evoke. Her beliefs
about the communicator and about the intended audience inform not only
her interpretation of the form, but also the extent to which it is encountered
as an image, rather than a symbol with conventional meaning in the case of
the recycling sign interpretation, or a codified, structured form in the case
of the knot diagram interpretation. In making a distinction between text
and image, Victor Fei Lim uses the example of a smiley face icon, which,
if its mouth were rendered as a red brushstroke rather than a black printed
line, would be read very differently; the meaning of the image would alter,
whereas for a text the meaning would still stay essentially the same [5, page
227]. If it is interpreted as such, factors such as the quality and colour of the
lines of a knot diagram are, to a person who is familiar with them, unlikely to
alter the way in which the diagram is ‘read’. In the example given in Figure 1,
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the mathematician is very much less likely to pay attention to whether the
image is drawn in white or in vivid red if she encounters it in the setting of
the classroom, rather than that of the gallery.
To a trained audience member, then, it may be that a diagram acquires a
more language-like status. Only certain elements are considered to be useful,
and their combination is constrained by sets of rules. Diagrams are treated
with suspicion by some mathematicians as a result of what some consider to
be their perilous underdeterminedness [8].
The attribution of intention may even account for the effectiveness of even the
messiest of diagrams; often the knots drawn in talks are so hastily sketched
that the lines either side of a crossing are wildly misaligned, yet this causes
no problem for the audience’s comprehension. As Giardino states: “. . . the
diagram does not need to be properly drawn, as long as the user is aware
of the prescriptions contained in the instructions for its construction and is
aware of its intended meaning,” [9, page 149]. Only the discrete, relevant fea-
tures are important and need to be reproduced, and many of the qualitative
features may be discarded along the way.
3. The Materials and Settings of a Conference Talk
The audience attending a talk at a conference can be very diverse in terms
of the level of understanding of the work being presented. Some attendees
will be working on something very closely related, and understand everything
that is being discussed, some will be working in the same field and understand
some of the content, and some will be students, there simply to familiarise
themselves with the field.
Such presentations play a very different role when compared with the publi-
cation of papers. A piece of work is established and accepted by publishing
a paper in a peer-reviewed journal, where the paper will be carefully read
by reviewers and each step checked; once the paper passes, it is considered
reliable enough to be built upon. A conference presentation instead outlines
the main ideas in the argument (not necessarily covering all of the detail),
and ‘sells’ both the work and the topic as interesting areas to work on. The
detailed, exhaustive presentation in a paper is necessary if the reader is to
work with a topic, but in a presentation a presenter aims to pique interest,
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outline basic principles, and give the audience a window into a field of en-
quiry. As such, the setting demands a particular kind of careful, effective
communication.
3.1. Blackboard use
Greiffenhagen notes the ubiquity and centrality of blackboards in mathemat-
ics departments [12, page 506], very unusual in an age when most disciplines
are happily migrating to slide presentations. In a set of interviews with
attendees at the Knots in Hellas conference in Greece, 2016,1 I encountered
several arguments in favour of blackboard use. These properties are certainly
not exclusive to blackboards; some or all might be found in other methods,
such as slides or handouts. If we are to explain the particular popularity
of blackboards, though, it seems worthwhile to consider the combination of
features that make them effective and exactly how these are manifested.
1. Pacing. Blackboards slow a presenter down, by virtue of the laborious
writing process. This can create long pauses, and these can also en-
courage a presenter to elaborate or add more detail while drawing or
writing.
2. Incrementality. A presenter must write or draw everything, from the
ground up. This may re-enact something of the process of enquiry, or
allow an audience member to gradually build up an understanding of
the material on the board that matches the presenter’s.
3. Spatiality. Purpose-built pictures can be drawn according to need,
which can be difficult to do on a computer. A presenter can also give the
audience clues about the importance or role of a particular statement
by placement or style; for example, writing a statement in large letters
in the centre of the board would indicate that this is a key statement
in the main flow of the talk, whereas writing it in cramped letters in
a corner might suggest that it was an interesting and related side note
or relevant background assumption.
4. Acting as an ‘external memory’. Blackboards can often be moved up
and down, allowing notes to remain visible for a long time before they
are rubbed off again, unlike a slide projection in which the contents of
1 Interviews conducted with Dr. Andrew Fish, Dr. Josh Howie, and David Freund,
mathematicians and students of mathematics.
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a slide are invisible as soon as the presenter moves on. For the audience
this allows artificial ease of recall if they want to refer back to points
mentioned earlier in the talk, which compensates for their relative lack
of familiarity with the topic.
These arguments might be understood in terms of James Gibson’s notion of
affordances, which can be understood as that which an object or environment
makes available to a person [10], for example, the affordance for holding
provided by the handle on a teapot. The affordances of a blackboard might
facilitate practices that help an audience member to achieve comprehension.
This is particularly useful because it is very difficult as a presenter to remain
adequately conscious of the fact that an audience member does not have the
same background knowledge and familiarity with the material.
3.2. The diagram as communicative device
Knot theory is a field with a particularly interesting, formalised diagram-
ming practice, described by Marcus Giaquinto in his extended study of vi-
sual thinking in mathematics [8], and philosopher James Robert Brown in a
chapter that also notes the landscape of knot diagrams and the absence of
research on the topic [3, pages 84–98].
A remarkable amount of time and energy is spent on diagramming in presen-
tations. The explanation of a particular concept in a talk tends to involve
many small, useful sketches and illustrations in comparison with the more
austere, textual presentation seen in the paper. To understand why there
is this difference we can consider the aims and goals of presentations: to
give ready access to the main ideas of a piece of mathematics, to “sell” a
mathematical field as a good and interesting place to study, and to show the
audience something of the way that those working in the field are under-
standing the content.
Diagrams have been said to offer various helpful affordances, such as the
possibility of using devices such as proximity and visual rhythm to establish
associations between elements [15, page 71]. Silvia De Toffoli and Valeria
Giardino describe diagrams as tapping into a manipulative imagination that
allows us to use them like tools, which they outline as follows:
“Experts perform actions on diagrams by re-drawing them in ap-
propriate ways, according to the way they interpret them. For
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this reason, novices need to train their imagination in order to
recognize the various possible moves on diagrams, and then be
able to effectively use them. Moreover, these manipulations are
similar to the manipulations we can perform on concrete objects,
but instead of having a pragmatic aim, they have an epistemic one
(Kirsh and Maglio 1994). The use of diagrams triggers a form
of manipulative imagination that gets enhanced by the practice.”
[4, page 836]
The gradual, enactive work of blackboard use may help to train us in these
manipulations. Seeing a diagram being built up by a live presenter gives us
a different kind of access to its possible uses and constraints.
4. Guided interpretation in conference presentations
Although many forms of diagram are commonly used, innovation is always
occurring, and when a new usage or form crops up it can be necessary to guide
an audience member through its interpretation and manipulation, in order to
establish an understanding of its affordances that is shared between speaker
and audience. Line drawings can be given quite a range of interpretations;
in particular it is important to establish the permissible manipulations of
an element. This could be understood as training a viewer to know how
the diagram can be manipulated and what the ‘grammar’ of the permitted
moves might be. A solid diagonal line met on either side by two shorter
perpendicular lines might potentially be seen as a crossing, or as a cut, or as
the joining of two unlike elements, or of three, depending on the perspective
and experience of the viewer. Although such basic elements can be very
well established, new applications or developments are happening all the
time (such as in the establishment of new conventions for virtual knots) and
training may be taking place more broadly than is immediately apparent. In
one talk, in which the presenter demonstrates certain geometrical operations
on knots, the presenter often speaks as though training, using phrasings like:
“Step two . . . is you cut the whole thing in half along the projec-
tion plane . . . ” [22]
In relevance theoretic terms, this might be described as a process of adding in-
formation about the speaker’s intentions for the diagram, in order to strength-
en the manifestness of the interpretation used by experts and make it the
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easiest one to reach. This is achieved through a process of guiding atten-
tion, creating expectations, and bringing in contextual knowledge that can
be assumed to be mutual. These are particularly visible to an outsider —
more so than communication that occurs simply by code interpretation —
because often this training makes use of explanatory forms that require little
specialist knowledge, such as information that is made available and refer-
able on the blackboard, and metaphorical explanations that use far more
commonly-known contextual references.
Observing as a non-mathematician, communicative strategies that used re-
sources outside of the code of mathematics were particularly evident to me.
The following is a non-exhaustive list:
1. Combining images and notation to make use of the properties of more
than one mode
2. The strategic adding of ostension to increase the manifestness of certain
aspects of a diagram
3. Bringing in commonly-shared contextual knowledge by means of metaphor
4. Providing an appropriate cognitive environment by means of surround-
ing statements or images that ape the cognitive environment of the
expert
Below I detail some real-world examples that exemplify these strategies being
used in presentation scenarios.
4.1. Labelling shifts perceptions
Labelling can transfer qualities from one mode to the other; from text to
image, for example. Bringing a second mode into a diagram creates an
expectation that some feature of, say, letter-labels is going to prove useful,
causing an audience member to look for an interpretation of the diagram
that will make use of the features of letter-labels that they know. This might
strengthen the manifestness of features that have some aspect in common
with some already-known property of the imported mode. In Figure 2, the
board notes that accompanied a section using such a strategy are shown.
At this point during the talk, the speaker is identifying the ways in which
components of the drawing will correspond to components in the polyhedron
she is beginning to describe.
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Figure 2: Author’s recreation of the board work from Jessica S. Purcell’s talk “Geometric
Techniques in Knot Theory” [22]. Time stamp on IAS / YouTube video: 08:44
She labels the regions in between the loops of the knot with the letters A-F:
“They’re gonna meet in faces. So lemme label these faces ABCDEF [. . . ] So
the faces are going to correspond to regions of the diagram.” One property
of letter-labels is that each label is equally weighted; they look different and
sound different when pronounced, but are always interchangeable.2 This la-
belling move makes use of the audience’s contextual knowledge of letters and
uses this to strengthen an interpretation of the diagram: that of understand-
ing the areas between the loops as belonging to a class of things, ‘regions in
a diagram’.
Next, when she wants to draw attention to another component she refers back
to the letters, making use of another property, their facility for identification:
“. . . you’ll get an edge when um– two of the faces bump into each other– and
they’re going to bump into each other at crossings. So right here for example
there’s gonna be an edge between face E and face B on this polyhedron that’s
coming up above. [. . . ] That’s gonna give you an edge of the polyhedron.”
Having drawn attention very efficiently to two particular regions she adds a
line that draws attention to the crossing at which they meet, speaking about
a class of ‘areas where the regions meet’; the line is very small, so she uses red
chalk to make it more salient. This time she simply adds one annotation to
one section of the diagram; the idea that such a move will apply to every such
2 Goodman’s theory of symbols contain a set of reasonable assumptions about diagrams,
and this includes the assumption that things given a similar graphical representation
should be similar [20].
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instance in the diagram has been favoured and made available to the audience
by the labelling move. In the previous labelling process, the audience was
trained to understand that the move is to be repeated for each example of a
particular thing in the diagram, so repetition isn’t necessary.
Finally, the speaker states “then the vertices are the remnants of the knot, in
fact they’re going to correspond to overstrands”, and traces over one of the
crossing arcs she had drawn for a second time. This time she doesn’t add
anything to the diagram but ostensively reinforces existing features of the
diagram, the effect being to draw attention to these strands as similarly a
class of things with a new place in the polyhedron.
4.2. Emphasis as signal
By adding emphasis with vocal cues or by spending extra time on something,
a speaker creates an expectation in a hearer that there must be additional
effects to justify the extra interpretive effort that such moves create. This
can make it clear that a certain aspect requires particular attention, or create
expectation that there is extra work to be done. A discussion of Figure 3
will illustrate this.
Figure 3: Author’s recreation of the board work from Jennifer Hom’s talk “Heegaard
Floer Homology and the Knot Concordance Group” [23] explaining the connected sum
operation. Time stamp on IAS / YouTube video: 01.21–01.34
The speaker begins by stating:
“So there’s an operation on knots called the connected sum [. . . ]
you just have two knots and um you connect them.”
To exemplify this operation, the speaker keeps the images on the board and
acts directly upon them. Having connected the two images, she makes a
gesture that emphasises the orientedness already suggested by the arrows.
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This added layer of ostension makes the shared orientation more salient to
the audience. She highlights it using a hand gesture, introducing animation
into the diagram arrangement. The implication of the arrows suggesting
a particular route becomes considerably more manifest, using the familiar
progress of movement around a track to favour the interpretation of the knot
diagrams as specifying a particular route that must be respected.
4.3. Building up a shared understanding of a diagram
Figure 4 shows the board notes from a particular section of a talk.
Figure 4: Author’s recreation of the board work from Jessica S. Purcell’s talk “Geometric
Techniques in Knot Theory” [22]. Time stamp on IAS / YouTube video: 11.50
The speaker:
1. Draws the projection plane,
2. Draws the embedded links (labels),
3. Draws small example orthogonal links,
4. Highlights where they’d ‘cross’,
5. Draws them in on the diagram.
The speaker states, “there are components which lie entirely in the projection
plane”, and draws a parallelogram, a common diagramming device that repre-
sents a two-dimensional plane. By sketching a roughly perspectival tabletop-
like rectangular area, the diagrammer sets up a limited two-dimensional field
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in which the rest of the diagramming can proceed. The ostensive stimulus,
the sketch, is extremely rough, but the shared knowledge of diagramming con-
ventions picks up a lot of the slack, and the speaker is aware of this, meaning
that any additional time spent on this would likely be wasted. Once the plane
has been drawn, it sets up an expectation that its two-dimensionality will be
used, like Chekov’s gun. She states “there are some components which just
sit in here”; the three “embedded links” sit within the area of the board that
she has delineated and also within the remit of the diagramming conceit, to
be read as lying within it.
In the next stage, she names the second type of component ‘crossing circles’
and states that they are orthogonal to the projection plane. At this stage,
rather than adding to the main diagram she draws a new, miniature one,
beginning with a vertical oval, then a small parallelogram, and adding two
additional lines on either side: “so here’s the projection plane. It’s orthog-
onal to that and exactly two strands of – of the link run through it.” She
emphasises two dots, one on each side of the oval (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Author’s recreation of the board work from Jessica S. Purcell’s talk “Geometric
Techniques in Knot Theory” [22]. Time stamp on IAS / YouTube video: 17.02
This extra effort is to propose the idea that the circle is not lying within
the established plane but at 90 degrees, intersecting the plane at two points.
This move is introduced in a much more careful way, and the ways in which
the plane and circle are to intersect are carefully outlined using the dots;
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adding this evidence of intention encourages the audience to go slightly fur-
ther in interpreting the relationship of the circle to the plane. The small
extra diagram uses the audience’s familiarity with spatial interactions and
increases the manifestness of the two points where the circle and plane might
intersect so that the slightly more effortful interpretation that the circle is
not within the plane, but at ninety degrees to it, will be reached by the
audience.
The audience having been persuaded to ‘see’ the circle and two lines as a
three-dimensional arrangement, Purcell goes on to expand on these in another
set of side diagrams. Purcell states, “the first thing you’re gonna do is view
each of these crossing circles as bounding a disk”, and shades in the interior of
the circle. These moves serve to morph the audience’s understanding of the
sketched circles on the board, shifting them from circle-like things (round,
empty, constructed from one line) to disk-like things (flat, solid). In this
side diagram, the lines also truncate earlier than usual, as they would when
passing through an opaque surface.
The next move is outlined verbally as follows:
“and then I’m gonna cut along it ok <writes ‘cut along it’>
so just you can think of this this is a full slice of pitta bread and
its <draws over drawing>
I I sliced it down the middle so it’s open inside
so you can kind of push it apart from itself ok <pushing apart
gesture>”
The speaker is working to increase the mutual manifestness of the two-
sidedness of a disk form. By invoking the pitta bread comparison, the speaker
strengthens the idea of two sides that could potentially be separated, bringing
in a tactile example whose manipulation would be familiar from everyday life
for much of the audience — an embodied, action-based analogy that helps
the audience to see how the diagram should be treated. This strengthens
the idea of two-sidedness even to the point that the idea of flatness can be
slightly violated, as the notion of separating the two sides comes in. Having
established this idea, she transfers it to the main diagram, indicating this by
physically shading the crossing circles that occur within it.
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Purcell makes use of understandings of objects to gradually alter and de-
velop our understanding of the diagram. Each of these diagrams can be
understood as nested within the original one; she is not altering the thing
being represented, only the audience’s understanding of the diagram itself.
She makes additional features of our understanding of space and forms man-
ifest at different points in such a way as to alter an audience’s view of a
knot or link of this form. It isn’t a case of simple substitution, though; the
added description increases the manifestness of properties that are already
weakly manifest in our very large and assumable shared experience of space
and form.
The idea is to get the understanding of the diagram across as quickly and
efficiently (i.e., as relevantly) as possible. With a mixed audience, the speaker
benefits from making use of this kind of shared experience (rather than a
more coded, notational presentation requiring a lot more shared knowledge
and work) which provides essential pieces of ready-made context. The pitta
is not only something that everyone has used, it’s something that everyone
has manipulated in just the way she describes, so that manipulation easily
grows into her presentation of the way to read the disk.
5. Conclusion
I have endeavoured to sketch a process by which materials and broad commu-
nicative resources are included in mathematical practice, in a way that estab-
lishes shared understandings of even relatively codified forms. The speaker
encourages the audience to see a chalked form as she does, and so to appre-
ciate the moves that are permitted in its manipulation, and understand its
affordances. By careful direction, and the addition of ostension, a speaker
encourages the audience members to build up a subtle understanding of the
object grounded in their own cognitive environments, using not only the spe-
cialist knowledge that some proportion of the audience will share but also
broader contextual knowledge deployed in careful and selective ways.
There is a question here about whether diagrams operate in chiefly language-
like or picture-like ways, and the answer appears to be that aspects of each
are at play, in complex and interlocking ways. On the one hand, this process
of training shows both that their interpretation according to the norms of
the discipline is dependent on sharing and recognising the intentions behind
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their use; on the other, the use of metaphorical descriptions to build up an
understanding of a diagram as a manipulable object-like thing points to the
ways in which diagrams selectively make use of non-conventionalised, direct
experience.
Study of mathematics that takes seriously the interpersonal and material
resources used in the development of mathematics will help put forward an
image of the discipline as bound up with the same messy, material, interactive
negotiations as the rest of human endeavour.
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